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1 Introduction
Neoliberal policies have in recent years focused on
introducing institutional reform to facilitate and
regulate the operation of free markets. It is still
assumed that the freemarket is the best mechanism
to achieve efficient and equitable growth, alongside
technical prescriptions.A growing body of research
on the political economy of agribusiness and the
ways in which agribusiness and geopolitical interests
capture world commodity markets is largely ignored
within mainstream agricultural development
literature on Africa. After 20 years of neoliberal
reform in Africa, the same old formulas are
dogmatically asserted without critical reflection
(seeOlukoshi, this IDS Bulletin).
Bates (1981) dealt a telling indictment of the
elite basis of state policies inAfrica. But his analysis
largely focused on abstract models of markets and
failed to examine the interventions of the state in
agricultural production, which were often based
on linkages with agribusiness and aspiring private
sector capitalists. The interventions of the state in
agriculture served not only to promote patronage
but also the development of capitalist agriculture
and agribusiness. Bates failed to analyse the interests
of agribusiness in expanding into developing
country markets. This is an important factor, since
the open market policies he advocated play into
the interests of agribusiness. This article examines
how agricultural markets have been shaped by
power relations, often at the expense of the rural
poor, and how the organisation of frontiers,
transport and input supplies affect export crop,
food and agribusiness production.
2 The frontier and export crops
In looking at state interventions that control
producer prices to the detriment of farmers, one of
the sectors that Bates focused on was cocoa
production in Ghana. Bates argues that the state
sought to appropriate an increasing proportion of
the producer price to use in expanding its political
patronage. As a result farmers stopped producing
cocoa and turned to food production. During the
1980s Côte d’Ivoire was regarded as the economic
miracle ofAfrica, whose open door policies favoured
growth. By the 1990s the Ivorian economy entered
crisis as world cocoa prices collapsed, and there
were structural similarities between this and the
earlier crisis in Ghana. The existence of excellent
research on the interaction between production,
market prices, and crisis in Côte d’Ivoire enables
us to re-evaluate the earlier crisis in Ghana.
Cocoa production throughout the world is
patterned on cycles of boom, collapse and
movement of cocoa to new frontier areas of
remaining forest land. Cocoa is subject to a ‘forest
rent’ (Ruf 1997).New areas of production achieve
windfalls from soil conditions,moisture, and lack
of weeds and pests, which are reflected in low
production costs.As cocoa plantations become old
they become less productive, susceptible to pests,
and weed populations build up. The cost of labour
and inputs increase and profits decline. The cost
of rehabilitating cocoa in old producing zones is
high. Cocoa producers respond by migrating to
new areas of forest where production costs are lower.
Labour migrates to these new areas since labouring
is less arduous and gains better returns.The decline
of production in old areas can result in higher world
prices.New frontier areas come into production to
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satisfy demand. But this prevents prices being
upwardly adjusted to the cost of production in old
areas and eventually leads to lower prices as the
market becomes saturated.
Various types of farmers and labourers participate
in the development of frontier cocoa, and the ‘forest
rent’ captured on the frontier encourages farm
expansion and the hiring of labour. Far from being
a family activity, cocoa farming embodies complex
labour arrangements and social differentiation. In
both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire the cocoa industry
has been built with migrant labour from Burkina
Faso, Mali and Niger.
Cocoa production in Ghana started in the late
nineteenth century in the Eastern Region. By the
1920s, it had spread into theAshantiRegion.During
the 1940s, the new frontier lay inAhafo and cocoa
in the Eastern Region entered into decline,
undermined by serious pest attacks. By the 1970s,
the only frontier area remaining was in theWestern
Region, and in all the other regions cocoa was beset
by stagnation, declining yields and the need to
rehabilitate cocoa. Thus, the boom in cocoa during
the 1950s and early 1960s inGhana was the product
of new areas in the Western Region coming into
production. The crisis in the late 1960s and 1970s
was related to problems of production in the old
frontier areas, and cocoa production became largely
confined to the new frontiers in the west.
Similarly, inCôte d’Ivoire the cocoa frontier has
moved westward, albeit at a latter date.While cocoa
production began in the east in the 1920s, themajor
expansion in cocoa production occurred from the
1970s as production shifted into the centre and the
west. The decline of cocoa production in Ghana
corresponded with the rise of Ivorian production,
and the state in Côte d’Ivoire played a major role
in encouraging migrant labour from Sahelian
countries (particularly Burkina Faso andMali), and
creating land tenure systems that facilitated the
release of land to migrants including both Ivorian
and foreign migrants. Forest reserves were also
released for cultivation. This resulted in a rapid
expansion of cocoa during the boom of the 1970s.
The expansion of cocoa often led to a deficit of
food production in old cocoa areas wheremost land
was under mature plantation, and farmers
frequently purchased food crops to complement
declining household production. InGhana during
the 1970s, with the decline of both the old cocoa
frontiers and worldmarket prices, the government
responded to shortfalls in revenue – resulting from
its dependence on cocoa – by appropriating a larger
percentage of the producer price. This intensified
the crisis. Cocoa farmers in old areas now found
that prices for production barely accounted for the
cost of production. Unable to hire labour and
purchase pesticides and other inputs, farmers
became increasingly dependent upon their own
labour, and increasingly turned from cocoa to food
production tomeet their own family needs and also
as a source of income.Foodprices onnational urban
markets now compared favourably with cocoa.
In the Côte d’Ivoire government maintained
more stable producer prices during the 1970s and
1980s, encouraging an expansion of cocoa. The
government accumulated revenue through the
continued expansion of production. By the 1990s,
the limits of frontier expansion were reached as the
last uncultivated cocoa areas in the west of the
country were brought under cultivation. The old
areas of production now required rehabilitation.
However, the rapid expansion of cocoa cultivation
in Côte d’Ivoire, which came to produce 60 per
cent of the world’s cocoa, resulted in saturation of
the world market and declining real prices on the
worldmarket. The Ivorian government responded
as theGhanaian government had done two decades
earlier, by reducing producer prices to stabilise its
revenue, intensifying the decline. The decline in
incomes badly hurt Ivorian producers who had
become reliant uponhiredmigrant labour and could
no longer afford to produce cocoa, given the decline
of yields on old plantations, and the costs of labour
and of rehabilitation of old plantations. Increasingly,
it became themigrant Burkinabe families, with their
lower standards of living and their reliance on family
labour (including children), who could bear the
brunt of producing at very low margins (Leonard
and Oswald 1997). However, the gradual rise to
dominance of Burkina farmers in the cocoa industry
in the midst of a serious crisis and declining
standards of living was to unleash an ethnic backlash
and xenophobia. Paradoxically, the crisis in cocoa
takes place against a background of considerable
technical experimentations by farmers in adapting
cocoa to new conditions. It is the economic
constraints imposed by world markets rather than
the technical problems that elude farmers.
While it is possible to see the crisis in these two
countries as the result of the policy responses of
governments, ultimately the crisis is a product of
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commodity markets on which these two states have
become completely dependent. Both of these states
have attempted to diversify into other crops, but
there are limited openings and similar depressed
conditions prevail in other export commodity
markets. In the case ofCôte d’Ivoire the promotion
of cocoa was a diversification out of coffee, where
producer prices deteriorated in the 1970s. Today,
coffee is subject to an even more intense crisis. In
spite of high demand and high market prices in
Western consumer markets, major international
traders have managed to build up stockpiles and
pay producers rock bottom prices.
African countries have extremely limited scope
for diversifying into new markets or developing
innovatory new crops, since they are beset by highly
regulatory policies that restrict market access in
Europe andNorth America. The cost of mediating
food regulations and tariffs is considerable and
involves a large expenditure on research,
information systems and legal representation. This
can frequently only be carried out by multinational
agribusiness. Even the concepts of fair trade and
certification are bound by so many legal and
bureaucratic constraints that they effectively exclude
enterprising farmer groups within developing
countries from taking the initiative, andmake them
dependent upon links with international
agribusiness (see Barrientos et al., this IDS Bulletin).
While African farmers are particularly prone to
declining world market prices, this affects many
farmers in many regions of the world including in
theUSA and Europe, where flexible accumulation
has allowed supermarket chains to access produce
from the cheapest areas of the world, rendering
whole farming populations marginalised and
obsolete. This includes the likes of sheep farmers
in Wales who are unable to compete with New
Zealand lamb on the shelves of the supermarket
chains. In many industrial countries farmers are
being subsidised to keep land out of production.
3 Food markets
Moving resources from export crops into food crops
becomes a rational mechanism for many export
crop producers given the unpredictability of export
markets. However, food markets are also
increasingly influenced by power relations and
market control, as agribusiness extends its area of
influence throughout the world. In the Batesian
framework, tariffs were used by African states to
protect inefficient industries and sell their urban
produced commodities to urban people at inflated
prices.However,market deregulation does not only
open upAfricanmarkets to industrial commodities,
but also to agricultural commodities. One of the
fastest growing imports inWest Africa has beenUS
rice, and this is a profitable sector for import-export
traders. Since food consumption often accounts
for up to two-thirds of the budget of the average
urban family, pressures exist to provide increasingly
cheap food. The excess production of international
agribusiness can frequently undercut local
production and under economic liberalism
imported foods are increasingly replacing local food
products in the urban market.
A large part of the production of local food in
urban areas is made up of transportation costs.This
is often the case because lorries and vehicles plying
rural areas are frequently old and consume much
fuel.Fuel costs are also vulnerable to external shocks
concerned with geopolitical factors on international
markets. A large part of the petroleum price in
developed countries consists of taxation, and weary
donors often insist that African countries increase
the cost of petroleum fuel to increase tax revenues.
Traders and farmers do not have equal access to
transport, and frequently transport costs are
determined by economies of scale. Clark (1994)
found that transport charges form ahigh proportion
of the Kumasi price of food and that traders who
are able to hire a lorry pay considerably less per bag
than small traders. In commodities transported over
long distances large traders make adisproportionate
profit, even calculating for the risks.
Yam is one of the commodities identified by
Clark in which traders must operate on a large scale
to survive. Like many food commodities yam is
controlled by commodity marketing associations
of women traders organised under “market queens”.
These associations set the price of yams in the
market.These associations operate in both the large
consumer markets in the urban areas and wholesale
markets in the rural areas. In the rural wholesale
markets the yam associations buy from farmers and
sell the produce to the large urban traders. This
results in markets with a small number of buyers
for the product.
In theKintampoDistrict, one of themajor yam-
producing districts inGhana, wholesale traders do
not go out to the villages to purchase yam. Farmers
are forced to transport their yams to Kintampo
Part III Institutions and Markets
60
market. Since yams are bulky commodities, the
cost of transporting them to markets along
transport-scarce feeder roads is high.At the height
of the yamharvest season the traders pay low prices
to farmers that do not take into account the cost of
transportation. The traders know that the farmers
will be forced to sell the yams to them since they
cannot afford to transport the yams back to their
homes. Frequently, the cost paid to farmers is below
the cost of production, since yams require
considerable labour, which usually involves hiring
it.As a consequence of the low price paid for yams
many farmers are now gaining their main cash
income from charcoal production. Yam is an
important farm commodity. It is the second most
important crop to cassava in terms of its contribution
to agricultural gross domestic product. Little
research exists on yams and yam farmers depend
upon their own technology, usually based on bush
fallowing, rather than research station technology.
Despite predictions of its eminent decline since the
1960s, yam cultivation has continued to thrive. In
the contemporary setting yam cultivation is
threatened by a hostile marketing and policy
environment, rather than by technical constraints
on production.
Road building and infrastructure development
do not guarantee improved conditions for
agriculture if access to transport, markets and
information is unequally distributed. They rather
favour the development of the interests of themost
powerful. Markets are often driven by power
relations that donot guarantee food security, security
of livelihoods and the alleviation of poverty. In the
current situation the combination of liberalised
markets, which enable traders to import the world’s
food surplus into African food markets, and
monopoly control over the internal trade in
marketing and transport create insecurity, angst
and vulnerability for many farmers.
4 Agribusiness
The removal of subsidies on inputs favours
agricultural interventions by agribusiness in sectors
in which inputs are necessary to gain high yields
and commercial profits.The lack of sources of credit
and inputs and the demise of government input
programmes enables agribusiness companies to
exercise powerful control over farmers’ production
and markets.
For instance, theGhana Oil PalmDevelopment
Corporation, a privatised former joint Government
of Ghana andWorld Bank Project, now known as
the Kwae Project, has developed an outgrower
scheme in the Eastern Region. It provides farmers
with inputs and capital advances to grow hybrid
oil palms on their own land according to prescribed
cultural procedures. The farmers are bound by
contract to deliver all their fruits to the company.
The company deducts the loan and compound
interest from the farmer’s yield. The price paid by
the company is often below local market prices,
which results in disgruntled farmers who divert
fruits to the local market. Seven thousand farmers
were dispossessed of 9,000 hectares of land tomake
way for the project. This has resulted in a large
landless youth population who are forced to earn
a livelihood as casual labourers.Many of them raid
the plantation at night to earn a living (Amanor
1999). The unpopularity of the outgrower scheme
has resulted inmany farmers attempting to develop
their own plantations. Those without sufficient
capital contract their land to sharecroppers with
capital to develop oil palm plantations, which are
shared between the landowners and the tenant.
This has further compounded the plight of local
youth, who can no longer gain access to land
through family circuits as production becomes
increasingly commodified.
Although modern palm oil production has
successfully displaced other forms of agriculture,
this has resulted in increasing social differentiation
(or “de-agrarianisation”), the rise of an underclass,
and insecurity over markets, lands and livelihoods.
Successful technical interventions have beenmade,
but these are shaped and controlled by powerful
economic interests.
5 Conclusion
Many assumptions abound about agricultural
markets in Africa. Extravagant claims are made
about how expansion of the market and existing
technologies can result in poverty alleviation.Much
of what passes as researchhas become an advertising
campaign, which promotes particular commodities,
commodified knowledge, and the supermarkets of
the world as having the magical power to solve
poverty. This lacks any framework of how poverty
results from the immanent processes of the
development of capitalism and markets. It sees
poverty as static and outside of history.Agricultural
markets and agribusiness need to be made the
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subjects of more rigorous and critical research that
examines their effects on different strata of
producers, and how they are mediated by the
interests of the rich and powerful both within
national and global markets. Research needs to
investigate how producers perceive, interact with
and attempt to circumvent agricultural markets,
and their access or lack of access to relevant support
structures and information (see Fairhead and Leach,
this IDS Bulletin). The processes of social
differentiation within specific localities and regions
need to be made the subject of research.
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